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Introduction
Hong Kong has long been regarded as the classic example of a laissez-faire
economy. Anxious to promote trade and attract foreign capital, the Hong Kong
government has pursued a policy known as 'positive non-interventionism.' In
essence this means that the government provides an impartial legal system and
the infrastructure necessary for industry and commerce, but avoids enacting
legislation that would be viewed as unduly burdensome to business. Although
this philosophy has been modified somewhat in recent decades, the govern-
ment still endeavours to maintain Hong Kong as a 'basically free-enterprise,
market-disciplined system,' with 'minimal government intervention in the
private sector.'
Hong Kong's adherence to laissez-faire principles is considered an essential
element of its economic success.2 Even the Chinese government purports to
accept that a capitalist economic system should be preserved in Hong Kong.
The Hong Kong Basic Law (which was enacted by China's National People's
Congress and serves as Hong Kong's constitution from 1 July 1997) promises
that the 'socialist system and policies will not be practised in Hong Kong' and
that the 'previous capitalist system' shall be practised for at least fifty years.3 The
Basic Law also includes several specific articles promising economic autonomy
from China and the continuation of Hong Kong's legal system, laws, and free
market policies.4 Of course, in the political sphere, China has already been
accused of deviating from the Basic Law (for example by weakening Hong
Kong's Bill of Rights Ordinance and by establishing an entirely appointed
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1 Hong Kong 1994 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government Information Services, 1994), p 58. Similar
statements can be found in the Economy chapter of the other issues of this annual publication. The
image of Hong Kong as the last bastion of pure capitalism is somewhat exaggerated. For example, in
1996 more than one-half of the population was living in public housing: Hong Kong 1996 (Hong
Kong: Hong Kong Government Information Services, 1996), p 184. For a history of the develop-
ments that led the government to operate one of the most extensive public housing programmes in
the world, see L C Chau, 'Public Housing' in H C Y Ho and L C Chau (eds), The Economic System
of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Asian Research Services, 1989), pp 242-56.
2 Sung Yun-wing, in Y C Jao (ed), Economic Development and Chinese Societies (Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 1989), p 155.3 Preamble and Art 5 (BL5).
4 Ibid, especially BL8 and 105-119.
'provisional' legislature). However, in the area of economic policy, it appears
more committed to maintaining the status quo.
Hong Kong's labour market clearly reflects the influence of this laissez-faire
ideology and is considered an important element in the 'favourable business
climate' that the government seeks to provide. The labour movement has
traditionally been very weak and the absence of representative democracy has
made it difficult for workers to lobby for law reform. Although legislation
enacted since 1968 gives employees certain basic rights, the Hong Kong labour
market continues to be far less regulated than other jurisdictions at comparable
stages of development. As one local economist has observed:
Human resources and a system of free enterprise are generally considered to
be the main impetuses to Hong Kong's economic success ... It is in the
labour market that we can best observe the operation of these two factors...
In most other labour markets, the price mechanism is constrained by strong
unions and collective bargaining, monopolies, business regulations, labour
legislations, high taxes, and transfer payments. All these impediments to
market forces are practically absent in Hong Kong.5
Until very recently, employment discrimination legislation was one of the
'impediments' that was noticeably absent from Hong Kong statute book.' The
business community was firmly opposed to such laws, viewing them as interven-
tionist, costly to enforce, and unnecessary. The Hong Kong government was
happy to echo that sentiment, declining to propose any anti-discrimination
legislation that would apply to the private sector.
7
Nonetheless, in mid-1995 Hong Kong's first anti-discrimination laws were
enacted: the Sex Discrimination Ordinance8 (which prohibits discrimination
on the grounds of sex, pregnancy, and marital status, as well as sexual
harassment) and the Disability Discrimination Ordinance (which prohibits
discrimination, harassment, and vilification on the ground of disability).9 An
5 L C Chau, 'Labour and the Labour Market' in Ho and Chau (note 1 above), p 169.
6 Previously, legal protection against discrimination in the private sector was limited to provisions in
the Employment Ordinance making it a criminal offence to discriminate against trade union
members and pregnant employees. See Joe England, Industrial Relations and the Law in Hong Kong
(Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed 1989), pp 176 and 237. See also Andrew Byrnes,
'Equality and Non-Discrimination' in Raymond Wacks (ed), Human Rights in Hong Kong (Hong
Kong: Oxford University Press, 1992), ch 6. For a discussion of the ineffectiveness of the Employment
Ordinance in preventing discrimination against pregnant employees, see discussion in the second
part below.
7 As recently as December 1992, the government took the position that sex discrimination legislation
was unnecessary and would have an 'adverse impact' on the economy. See Hong Kong government,
'Findings of Working Group on Sex Discrimination in Employment' (December 1992) on file with
the author. The government formed this inter-departmental working group in response to complaints
by women's organisations.
8 Ordinance No 67 of 1995.
9 Ordinance No 86 of 1995.
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additional law (prohibiting discrimination on the ground of family responsibil.
ity) was enacted in June 1996.10 The new laws apply to a wide range of activities,
including employment, education, housing, and the provision of goods and
services. However, the employment provisions are expected to have the
greatest impact. The laws are enforceable in the courts and also by the Equal
Opportunities Commission, which was established in 1996. The enactment of
this legislation and the creation of the Equal Opportunities Commission
represent a significant departure from the economic ideology of the Hong Kong
government.
The second part of this article considers the factors that forced the
government to abandon its 'laissez-faire' approach to the problem of discrimi-
nation and the progress that has been made in implementing the employment-
related provisions of the new laws. The following three parts analyse the main
duties created by the new laws and their likely impact on employment
practices. The final part discusses the remedies available to victims and the
enforcement powers of the Equal Opportunities Commission.
The development of Hong Kong's first anti-discrimination laws
The campaign for anti-discrimination legislation was led primarily by the
women's movement,11 in part because sex discrimination has been particularly
blatant in Hong Kong.'2 Until the employment provisions of the Sex Discrimi-
nation Ordinance came into force in December 1996, newspapers regularly
published job advertisements specifying the sex required for a position. Adver-
tisements also often made it clear that a hierarchy existed in the company,
seeking, for example, a 'male accounts supervisor' and a 'female clerk."3 Studies
of these advertisements have confirmed that the Hong Kong employment
market has been both horizontally and vertically segregated (meaning that
even those industries that tend to employ more women than men reserve more
10 Family Status Discrimination Ordinance.
1 For a general history of the women's movement in Hong Kong, see Tsang Gar-yin, 'The Women's
Movement at the Crossroads' in Veronica Pearson and Benjamin K P Leung (eds), Women in Hong
Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995).
12 This article is limited to the issue of discrimination by employers in the private sector. For a discussion
of laws and government policies that have discriminated against women in Hong Kong, see Carole
J Petersen, 'Equality as a Human Right: The Development of Anti-Discrimination Law in Hong
Kong' (1996) 34 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 335 (hereinafter 'Equality as a Human
Right'), especially at pp 338-48.
13 For examples of sexist advertisements, see Carole J Petersen, 'Failure of the Hong Kong Government
to Enact Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination in Employment' in Howarth, Jones, Petersen, and
Samuels, Report by the Hong Kong Council of Women on the Thrd Periodic Report by Hong Kong under
Article 40 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (March 1991), p 2 (hereinafter, Hong
Kong Counci of Women Report); and Carole J Petersen, 'Women at Work: Government Green Paper,'
Vol 1 The Employment Report No 6 (Asian Law Journal), p 3.
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managerial positions for men).' "There is also strong evidence of pay discrimi-
nation in Hong Kong, even where male and female employees hold the same,
quite specific, job titles (such as 'button sewer' or 'head teller') and are working
the same hours per month. 5
It is also well-known that Hong Kong employers are loath to pay maternity
leave and will often fire women when they become pregnant.1 6 In recognition
of this fact, the Employment Ordinance has made it an offence to do so. 7
However, the law initially applied only after the woman gave official notice of
her pregnancy, which she could not do until twelve weeks before the expected
date of birth. As a result, an employer could simply fire a woman as soon as it
became apparent that she was pregnant, before she could give notice of her
pregnancy and enjoy protection from termination. This practice was so
widespread that the government introduced, in 1987, an amendment to permit
the woman to give notice of the pregnancy at any time after it had been
medically certified.'S Unfortunately, the fine (HK$10,000, roughly equivalent
to US$1,300) 19 was so low that many employers continued to fire pregnant
women (concluding, quite rationally, that the fine would be less expensive
than maternity leave).2' Indeed, many employers escaped the fine altogether by
treating the pregnant employee so badly that she finally resigned.2 In the
absence of a civil remedy there was little incentive for the victims of such
discrimination to complain.
Although women's organisations lobbied for years for anti-discrimination
legislation, by the end of the 1980s they had made very little headway. It was
easy for the Hong Kong government to resist women's demands because its
executive and legislative branches were entirely appointed and therefore
largely unaccountable to the public. The Executive and Legislative Councils
14 See eg Ho Suk-ching, 'The Position of Women in the Labour Market in Hong Kong: A Content
Analysis of the Recruitment Advertisements' (1985) tO Labour and Society 334; Chan Kam-wah and
Ng Chun-hung, 'Gender, Class and Employment Segregation in Hong Kong' in Lau Siu-kai et al
(eds), Inequalities and Development: Social Stratification in Chinese Societies (Hong Kong: Hong Kong
Institute of Asian-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1994), ch 5; and Thomas W
P Wong, 'Women and Work: Opportunities and Experiences' in Pearson and Leung (note 11 above),
pp 47-66.
15 For an analysis of government reports showing pay discrimination within specific job titles, see
Petersen, Hong Kong Council of Women Report (note 13 above), pp 3-4 and 'Women at Work' (note
13 above), pp 2-3. Wong (note 14 above), pp 62-3 has observed income disparities even when
differences in education and age (as a proxy for experience) are controlled.
16 William K M Lee, 'Women Employment in Hong Kong' in Nyaw Mee-kau and Li Si-ming (eds), The
Other Hong Kong Report 1996 (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1996), pp 283-4.17 s 15.
18 See England (note 6 above), pp 175-6.
19 Employment Ordinance, s 15.
20 See South China Morning Post, 5 March 1997. In recognition of the failure of the law to curtail such
practices, the penalty was recently increased: Employment (Amendment) Ordinance (No 73 of1997).
21 The extent to which employers try to avoid the obligation to pay maternity leave is evidenced by a
recent survey showing that a substantial percentage of pregnant employees report that they have been
illtreated by their employers, transferred to difficult posts, or not paid the full amount of their
maternity leave. See Lee (note 16 above), pp 283-4.
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were also heavily representative of the business community. As one commen
tator has noted, there is an 'element of truth in the old jibe that Hong Kong is
run by the Jockey Club, Jardine Matheson, the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank, and
the Governor - in that order.'22
However, in the 1990s, the equality movement was strengthened by a
number of developments. As space limitations do not permit a detailed
discussion of these factors, they will only be summarised here."
The impact of the Bill of Rights
First, the anti-discrimination movement received some support (albeit mostly
symbolic) from the enactment of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Bill
of Rights).24 The government proposed a bill of rights (in late 1989) as part of
its effort to restore public confidence after the massacre in Beijing's Tiananmen
Square. 5 The Bill of Rights was essentially copied from the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The ICCPR contains three
articles prohibiting discrimination. The widest, Art 26 (which was copied into
Art 22 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance), states:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimi-
nation to the equal protection of the law. In this regard, the law shall
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.
The Hong Kong women's movement initially viewed the Bill of Rights as
a potentially powerful weapon against discrimination. They were particularly
encouraged by the fact that the initial draft of the Bill of Rights applied not only
to the government, but also to private persons. Thus, women hoped that it
could be used as a weapon against discrimination in the private sector.
However, the business community lobbied hard against such a broad applica-
tion and when the Bill of Rights Ordinance was enacted in July 1991 it was
amended so as to bind only the government and public authorities.26
22 Norman Miners, The Govemment and Politics of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 5th
ed 1991), p 47, quoting from R Hughes, Hong Kong: Borrowed Place, Borrowed Time (London:
Deutsch, 2nd ed 1976), p 17.
23 For a more detailed analysis of these developments and their relationship to 1997, see Petersen,
'Equality as a Human Right' (note 12 above), especially at pp 348-86.
24 Ordinance No 59 of 1991.
25 Miners (note 22 above), p 27. For a discussion of the campaign for a bill of rights in Hong Kong prior
to 1989, see Nihal Jayawickrama, 'Hong Kong and the International Protection of Human Rights'
in Wacks (note 6 above).
16 See the Legislative Council's debate on the Bill of Rights Bill in LegCo Proc, 5 June 1991, pp 2307-
39. See also Andrew Byrnes, 'The Hong Kong Bill of Rights and Relations Between Private
Individuals' in Johannes Chan and Yash Ghai (eds), The Hong Kong Bill of Rights: a Comparative
Approach (Hong Kong: Butterworths, 1993), especially at pp 83-8.
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In the end, even in the area of public discrimination the Bill of Rights
proved far less effective than women had hoped." However, the debate
surrounding the Bill of Rights (particularly the question of whether it should
apply to private parties) publicised the extent of discrimination in Hong Kong
and helped to identify the right to equality as a 'human right,' worthy of legal
protection. In particular, the debate served to educate members of the Legis-
lative Council, many of whom became strong supporters of the women's
movement.
Support from the Legislative Council
The second significant development was the fundamental change in the role
of the Hong Kong Legislative Council. In preparation for 1997, the Legislative
Council became more democratic, with the first directly elected seats intro-
duced in 1991. The legislature thus became more accountable to the general
public, less beholden to the business community, and more willing to challenge
the government.28 As a result, in the early 1990s legislators frequently criticised
the government's failure to address sex discrimination in Hong Kong. For
example, in December 1992 the Legislative Council voted unanimously in
favour of a motion calling upon the Hong Kong government to request the
United Kingdom to extend the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (Women's Convention) to Hong Kong. 9
This motion represented a clear challenge to the Hong Kong government, not
only because it had long opposed the Women's Convention, but also because
it would require Hong Kong to enact anti-discrimination legislation. Although
the government was not obligated to change its position on the Women's
Convention (and, indeed, did not do so for some time), it could not simply
ignore the unanimous vote of the Legislative Council. The government thus
promised to conduct its first formal consultation of the public on sex discrimi-
nation, by issuing a 'Green Paper' on the issue.3" The government took more
than a year to complete the process and used a very biased consultative
document.3' Nonetheless, at the conclusion of the consultation period it was
27 For a discussion of the reasons why the Bill of Rights has proven largely ineffective, even against
discriminatory laws and government policies, see Carole J Petersen, 'The Hong Kong Bill of Rights
and Women: A Bait and Switch?' in Fong, Byrnes, and Edwards (eds), Hong Kong Bill of Rights: Two
Years On (Hong Kong: Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong, 1993), pp 95-113. See also Petersen,
'Equality as a Human Right' (note 12 above), pp 357-61.2See Kathleen Cheek-Milby, A Legislature Comes of Age: Hong Kong's Search for Influence and IdentitY
(Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995), especially ch 7.
29 LegCo Proc, 16 December 1992, p 1451. All members present voted in favour of the motion except
for the three ex officio members (government officers), who spoke against the motion but abstained
from voting in the face of certain defeat.30 Green Paper on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government,
August 1993) (hereinafter the Green Paper).
31 For an analysis of several misleading and biased statements in the Green Paper, see Carole J Petersen,
'The Green Paper on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men: An Exercise in Consultation or
Evasion?' (1994) 24 HKLJ 8, 11-13.
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forced to admit that the majority of responses were in favour of the Women's
Convention and the enactment of anti-discrimination legislation."
Meanwhile, in September 1993 (while the Green Paper consultation
exercise was still ongoing), a member of the Legislative Council directly
challenged the government's 'laissez-faire' policy towards discrimination.
Anna Wu began drafting her own private member's bills, the Equal Opportu-
nities Bil 3  and the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission Bill
(the Commission Bill).34 The Equal Opportunities Bill was intended to
prohibit discrimination on a wide range of grounds (including sex, marital
status, pregnancy, family responsibility, disability, sexuality, race, age, political
and religious conviction, and spent convictions35) in a broad range of activities
(including employment, education, housing, the provision of goods and
services, and the administration of laws and government programmes). The
Commission Bill would have created an independent public body to enforce
the rights created by the Equal Opportunities Bill, as well as other internation
ally recognised human rights.36
By drafting these bills on her own, Wu took the initiative away from the
executive branch. In the past, the government had proposed and drafted almost
all new laws. The role of the Legislative Council was to study the government's
bill, propose amendments, and debate and vote upon it. Prior to 1991, private
members' bills were rare and used only to incorporate or regulate the affairs of
a charity or other private institution.37 However, as the Legislative Council
became more democratic and assertive, non-government members began to
draft and introduce public bills. Wu's Equal Opportunities Bill was the most
ambitious of these bills, in that it covered an entire area of law.38
Wu faced one important legal constraint. Under Hong Kong's colonial
constitution, a member of the Legislative Council was required to obtain
express permission from the Governor before she could introduce any bill that
would require the expenditure of public revenue.39 Fearing a refusal, Wu drafted
32 See Statement of the Secretary for Home Affairs, South China Morning Post, 31 December 1993.
See also Green Paper on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men: Compendium of Submissions (Hong
Kong: Hong Kong Government, May 1994).33 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Legal Supplement No 3, 1 July 1994, pp C991-1275.34 Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission Bill 1994, draft distributed for public consul-
tation, March 1994. Unlike the Equal Opportunities Bill, the Commission Bill was not published in
the Government Gazette because Governor Patten refused permission for it to be introduced into the
Legislative Council (see discussion below). However, it was published as an appendix to an article
by Anna Wu. See Edwards and Byrnes, Hong Kong Bill of Rights: 1991-1994 and Beyond (Hong Kong:
Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong, 1995), appendix.3 A person has a 'spent conviction' if he has been convicted of at most one offence, was not sentenced
to death, imprisonment, or a fine exceeding $5,000, and has had a'clean' record for at least three years:
Equal Opportunities Bill, cl 188.
3 Commission Bill, cls 62-101.
17 See Miners (note 22 above), p 121.
38 Cheek-Milby (note 28 above), p 243.39 Royal Instructions, cl XXIV(2)(c), reprinted in Andrew Byrnes and Johannes Chan (eds), Public Law
and Human Rights: A Hong Kong Sourcebook (Hong Kong: Butterworths, 1993), pp 27-37.
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the Equal Opportunities Bill so that it would not require any funding (and
therefore could be introduced without the Governor's permission). 40 However,
it was impossible to draft the Commission Bill so as not to require public
revenue and the Governor did, indeed, refuse Wu permission to introduce it.41
The Equal Opportunities Bill was introduced into the legislature in July
1994. A Bills Committee (to study the bill and receive public submissions) was
formed and began meeting in August 1994, with a view to putting the bill to
a vote by July 1995. The introduction of Wu's bill put the Hong Kong
government in a difficult position. The women's movement had acquired
significant support in the legislature and in the general public (as demonstrated
by the Green Paper consultation exercise). Public sympathy for the disabled
was also at a high point, following several well-publicised incidents of discrimi-
nation against them (including violent demonstrations against the establish-
ment of centres for the mentally disabled in residential areas). Other groups
who stood to benefit from Wu's bill - racial minorities, trade unions, and gay
rights groups - were also lobbying in support of Wu, in the hope that she could
seize the momentum and enact a truly comprehensive anti-discrimination law.
Given the widespread public demand for action against discrimination,
even the pro-business legislators would have had difficulties voting against
Wu's bill - unless they could be presented with a more conservative alterna-
tive bill. The government thus reluctantly announced that it would introduce
bills prohibiting the two areas of discrimination that had generated the most
public support - sex discrimination and disability discrimination. It quickly
drafted a Sex Discrimination Bill (essentially copying the UK's Sex Discrimi-
nation Act and adding several exemptions) and introduced it in October
1994.42 The government's Disability Discrimination Bill followed in April
1995. The Sex Discrimination Bill was significantly more conservative than
the relevant provisions of the Equal Opportunities Bill, containing more
exemptions and provisions designed to delay the bill's implementation.
43
But despite these weaknesses, the government's proposal had one thing that
the women's movement and the disabled groups wanted, and which Anna
40 The Equal Opportunities Bill was drafted so as to be enforceable through the existing court system.
Had both bills been enacted, the Commission Bill would have amended the Equal Opportunities Bill
to provide for enforcement through the Commission and an Equal Opportunities Tribunal:
Commission Bill, c 103.
41 See Sally Blyth, 'Exco Rejects Wu's Rights Commission,' Eastern Express, 22 June 1994. As a result
of the Governor's refusal, the Legislative Council was not permitted to study or debate Wu's
Commission Bill. Although opposition from China was certainly a factor in the Governor's decision,
Wu has argued that Hong Kong's colonial government also did not want an independent human
rights commission monitoring its compliance with international norms. See Anna Wu, 'Human
Rights: Rumour Campaigns, Surveillance and Dirty Tricks, and the Need for a Human Rights
Commission' in George Edwards and Andrew Byrnes (eds), Hong Kong's Bill of Rights: 1991-1994 and
Beyond (Hong Kong: Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong, 1995), pp 73-80.
42 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Legal Supplement No 3, 14 October 1994, pp C1382-535.
43 For example the Sex Discrimination Bill included a provision giving the secretary unlimited
discretion as to when it would come into force and a five year exemption for small businesses.
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Wu's bill could not give them - an Equal Opportunities Commission.
Although the Governor had refused to permit Wu to introduce her own
Commission Bill, the government wisely provided for an Equal Opportunities
Commission in its own proposal. The ambit of the government's proposed
commission was narrower than the one proposed by Wu (as it would not address
general human rights concerns or the implementation of international con-
ventions). But it could assist victims and attempt to conciliate complaints of
discrimination4 (an approach that appealed to the business community as well
as to victims, as it could avoid costly litigation).
Recognising the value of an Equal Opportunities Commission, Wu an-
nounced (in the spring of 1995) that she would withdraw the provisions of her
bill relating to sex and disability discrimination and support the government's
Sex Discrimination Bill and Disability Discrimination Bill. She then tried to
amend the government's bills (so as to reduce the number of exemptions and
expand the functions of the Equal Opportunities Commission).
Several of Wu's proposed amendments to the government's bills were
accepted by the government and therefore easily enacted. Her remaining
amendments were debated in the Legislative Council, where the government
succeeded in defending most of its exemptions. Wu also continued to lobby for
the enactment of the parts of her Equal Opportunities Bill that were not
addressed by the government's bills. 5 The remaining grounds of discrimination
covered by Wu's Equal Opportunities Bills (including age, sexuality, race,
political and religious belief, and family status) came to a vote in late July 1995.
These bills were supported by the majority of the members of the Bills
Committee and by the Democratic Party (which held the largest number of
directly elected seats in the Legislative Council). However, the government
lobbied hard against her, arguing that Hong Kong should gain experience with
the Sex Discrimination Ordinance and the Disability Discrimination Ordi-
nance before adopting broader legislation. This argument provided legislators
with an acceptable explanation for rejecting more comprehensive legislation.
In the end, the combined forces of the government's ex-officio members,
appointed members, and pro-business legislators provided enough votes to
defeat Wu's bills.
Implementation of the new laws
Given that the Hong Kong government was essentially pushed into introduc-
ing anti-discrimination laws, it is not surprising that it drafted the bills so as to
44 See Sex Discrimination Bill, cis 56 and 75-7.
4 Wu reintroduced these provisions as three separate bills: the Equal Opportunities (Family Respon-
sibility, Sexuality, and Age) Bill; the Equal Opportunities (Race) Bill; and the Equal Opportunities
(Religious or Political Conviction, Trade Union Activities, and Spent Conviction) Bill: Hong Kong
Government Gazette, Legal Supplement No 3, 30 June 1995, pp C1660-1971 (the Equal Opportu-
nities Bills).
332 Carole J Petersen (1997) HKI.I
provide for fairly slow implementation. Both laws gave the government
complete discretion as to when to bring them into force" and it refused to
implement either law until the Equal Opportunities Commission was created
and fully operational. (This was not strictly necessary, as victims could enforce
the laws in the courts as well as through the Commission.) The government was
then quite slow to establish the Commission: it did not advertise the key
position of Chairman of the Commission until March 1996, a full eight months
after the two ordinances were enacted. 47 As a result, the Chairman (Dr Fanny
Cheung) did not take up the position until May 1996. She devoted much of the
summer of 1996 to the recruitment of other staff and the Commission did not
become fully operational until September 1996.
The non-employment provisions of the Sex Discrimination and Disability
Discrimination Ordinances were brought into force in September 1996, shortly
after the Equal Opportunities Commission became fully operational. The
employment provisions were delayed even further, until 20 December 1996.
This was because the Secretary for Home Affairs refused to bring the employ-
ment provisions into force until detailed 'Codes of Practice' could be issued to
guide employers on their obligations under the new laws. Women's and
disability groups objected to this plan, as they feared that it could potentially
delay enforcement of the employment provisions by an additional year or more
(because the Codes of Practice had to be drafted in consultation with employer
and employee groups and then be tabled for approval by the Legislative
Council). However, the Commission's staff actually worked very quickly
(putting in many late nights). It conducted two rounds of public consultations,
and managed to table the Codes before the Legislative Council by 20 Novem-
ber 1996. The Legislative Council formed a subcommittee to study the Codes
and approved them (with some revisions). The Codes and the employment
provisions of the two ordinances thus came into force on 20 December 1996.
Small businesses (those employing five or fewer employees) continue to enjoy
a three-year exemption (from the date of enactment) from the duty not to
discriminate," but this exemption will expire in mid-1998.
Two additional bills were passed in June 1997. Christine Loh's Sex and
Disability Discrimination (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill was passed on 11 June
1996 (despite objections from the government and the business community),
significantly improving the remedies for discrimination and harassment.49 In
46 Sex Discrimination Ordinance, s 1; Disability Discrimination Ordinance, s 1. An amendment
proposed by Wu and the Bills Committee that would have brought them into operation no later than
1 January 1996 was defeated.47 See South China Morning Post, 3 March 1996.48 See Sex Discrimination Ordinance, ss 11(3)-(7); Disability Discrimination Ordinance, s 11( 3)-(5).
The exemption applies only to the provisionsprohibiting discrimination and not to provisions
prohibiting sexual harassment or 'victimisation' (discrimination against applicants and employees on
the ground that they have taken actions to enforce the ordinance).49 The impact of this ordinance is discussed further below.
Vol127 Part 3 Hong Kong's first anti-discrimination laws 333
33 arl Ieere (197 HK
addition, a government bill to prohibit discrimination on the grounds of family
responsibility was also enacted.5"
Compliance with the new laws will require some important changes to the
advertising, hiring, and management practices of many Hong Kong companies.
The legislation makes the employer vicariously liable for actions by employees
in the course of their employment - even if the employee acted without the
consent or knowledge of the employer.5 The only defence to such liability is
for the employer to show that it took 'such steps as were reasonably practicable'
to prevent the unlawful behaviour."2 Thus employers should be proactive and
design policies to prevent discrimination and harassment.
In deciding what steps to take, employers should pay close attention to the
two Codes of Practice on Employment. Technically, the Codes do not create
any additional legal duties. However, a failure to follow the recommendations
in the Codes can be used as evidence in court (for example, to show that a
person intended to discriminate or to show that the employer failed to take
'reasonably practicable' steps to prevent unlawful acts). 53 Thus, while not
technically enforceable, the Codes will have the practical effect of imposing
duties on employers - duties which reflect the Commission's application of
the laws to specific facts and which therefore are often more specific and
detailed than the general duties stated in the actual laws.
The following discussion is divided into three broad areas. The first deals
with discrimination on the grounds of sex, marital status, pregnancy, and family
status. The second examines the question of sexual harassment. The third
considers disability discrimination.
Discrimination on the grounds of sex, marital status, pregnancy, and
family status
Sex discrimination
Section 11 of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance states the basic obligation not
to discriminate on the basis of sex against applicants for jobs and existing
employees.54 It provides:
50 Family Status Discrimination Ordinance.
51 Sex Discrimination Ordinance, s 46; Disability Discrimination Ordinance, s 48; Family Status
Discrimination Ordinance, s 34.
52 Ibid.
53 Sex Discrimination Ordinance, s 69(14); Disability Discrimination Ordinance, s 65(13). At present
there is no code of practice on family status discrimination, but the Commission has issued a draft for
public consultation. See Family Status Discrimination Ordinance, s 47.54 Although s 11 protects only applicants and employees, the ordinance contains several provisions
designed to protect those who do not fall within the legal definition of 'employee' (such as contract
workers and partners in partnerships of at least six persons) and the legal principles discussed in this
section are thus applicable to those relationships as well. See Sex Discrimination Ordinance, ss 13
and 15. Several additional areas related to employment (such as trade unions, qualifying bodies,
employment agencies, and providers of vocational training) are also covered by the ordinance but are
outside the scope of this article: ibid, ss 17-19.
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(1) It shall be unlawful for a person, in relation to employment by him at
an establishment in Hong Kong, to discriminate against a woman -
(a) in the arrangements he makes for the purpose of determining who
should be offered that employment;
(b) in the terms on which he offers her that employment; or
(c) by refusing or deliberately omitting to offer her that employment.
(2) It is unlawful for a person, in the case of a woman employed by him at
an establishment in Hong Kong, to discriminate against her -
(a) in the way he affords her access to opportunities for promotion,
transfer or training, or to any other benefits, facilities or services,
or by refusing or deliberately omitting to afford her access to
them;
(b) in the terms of employment he affords her;
(c) by dismissing her, or subjecting her to any other detriment. 5
Of course, none of these actions are prohibited unless the woman can
demonstrate that they constitute 'discrimination' against her. Section 5 defines
discrimination against women, providing in relevant part:
(1) A person discriminates against a woman in any circumstances relevant
for the purpose of any provision of this Ordinance if -
(a) on the ground of her sex he treats her less favourably than he
treats or would treat a man; or
(b) he applies to her a requirement or condition which he applies or
would apply equally to a man but -
(i) which is such that the proportion of women who can
comply with it is considerably smaller than the proportion
of men who can comply with it;
(ii) which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of the
sex of the person to whom it is applied; and
(iii) which is to her detriment because she cannot comply with
it.
Part (a) of this definition is commonly referred to as 'direct discrimination,'
because it requires proof that the victim was treated less favourably on the
5 Although s 11 does not expressly mention 'equal pay for equal work,' this is clearly required by the
references to the 'terms of employment.' Whether the Sex Discrimination Ordinance also requires
equal pay for work of equal value is more controversial. The Sex Discrimination Code of Practice on
Employment states that 'employers are encouraged to progressively implement equal pay for equal
value.' However, it is certainly arguable that the Sex Discrimination Ordinance already requires equal
pay for work of equal value and the Code of Practice cannot lessen the obligations imposed by the
ordinance. For a discussion of the concept of equal pay for work of equal value in the context of Hong
Kong, see Anne Cheung, 'Pay Equity for Hong Kong: A Preliminary Exploration' (1995) 25 HKLJ
383.
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ground of her sex. However, it should be noted that s 4 of the ordinance provides
that if an act is done for two or more reasons and one of the reasons is the sex
(or marital status or pregnancy) of a person, then for the purposes of the
ordinance the act shall be taken to have been done because of the sex (or
marital status or pregnancy) of the person. This section did not appear in the
government's original draft of the Sex Discrimination Bill, but the government
agreed to borrow it from Wu's Equal Opportunities Bill.56
The impact of s 4 is best demonstrated by an example: suppose a company
gives speed and accuracy tests to all of its word processors and five (two women
and three men) fail the test. If the company decides to fire only the two women
who failed the test, its decision could be considered direct discrimination. The
company might argue that it fired these two women because they failed the test,
noting that the women who passed the test were not fired. In fact, the two
women were fired for two reasons - because they failed the test and because
they were women. However, under s 4 of the ordinance, the act would be taken
to have been done because they were women and it would thus constitute direct
sex discrimination. Another way of analysing the example is to ask: did the
women who were fired receive less favourable treatment than the men in like
circumstances? Clearly they did - the men who failed the test were not fired.
The Sex Discrimination Ordinance does not expressly prohibit employers
from asking the sex or marital status of the applicant or from requesting a
photograph with the application. However the Sex Discrimination Code of
Practice on Employment clearly states that employers should avoid this as it
'may indicate an intention to discriminate on the ground of sex.'57 The Code
of Practice also instructs employers to avoid questions on the application form
which could lead to discrimination against women (such as questions relating
to their marital status, number of children, and child-care arrangements). 58
Employers are instructed to ask in interviews only those questions 'that relate
directly to the essential requirements of the job.' Perhaps most important,
employers are advised to:
[E]nsure that personnel staff, line managers, and all other employees who
may be involved in staff recruitment receive training on lawful, non-
discriminatory practice. It should also be brought to their attention that it
is unlawful to instruct or put pressure on others to discriminate ...59
56 The clause in the Equal Opportunities Bill that ultimately became s 4 of the Sex Discrimination
Ordinance was borrowed from Australian legislation. See, for example, the Western Australia Equal
Opportunity Act reprinted in Australian and New Zealand Equal Opportunity Law and Practice
(Sydney: CCH Australia Limited), s 5.
57 Sex Discrimination Code of Practice on Employment, para 11.5.3.
58 Ibid, para 11.7.1.
59 Ibid, para 11.8.1.
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In jurisdictions with years of experience with anti-discrimination laws,
these recommendations may seem quite reasonable. However, in Hong Kong
the relationship between employers and employees has been largely unregu-
lated and discrimination in the private sector has been entirely legal. Thus, it
is quite significant for the Equal Opportunities Commission to issue a Code of
Practice that essentially tells employers to spend time (and money) to train
their managers about non-discriminatory employment practices and to per-
suade them to abandon ingrained sexist notions. If an employer (particularly
a large one with sufficient resources to comply with the Code) does not
undertake such training and discrimination occurs, this could be deemed a
failure to take 'such steps as were reasonably practicable' to prevent the
unlawful act. The employer could then be held vicariously liable for direct
discrimination by his employees, despite the fact that they may have been
committed without his knowledge or consent.
The second part of the definition of discrimination quoted above (s 5 (1) (b))
is commonly known as 'indirect' discrimination. This provides that it is also
discrimination if an employer applies to a woman a requirement or condition that
also applies to men, but which affects women disproportionately and which
cannot be justified by the employer. Indirect sex discrimination arises from
rules or requirements which on their face are neutral, but in fact put women
applicants or employees at a disadvantage. Unnecessary height and weight
requirements are the classic examples of 'indirect' sex discrimination. How-
ever, there are many less obvious practices that could be affected by the
legislation. For example, although there still is no law expressly prohibiting age
discrimination in Hong Kong, an upper age limitation might constitute
indirect sex discrimination (because women who have children tend to start
their careers later than men).6"
Similarly, a requirement that an employee work for five years' 'continuous'
service (with no breaks beyond normal vacation time and sick days) in order
to be eligible for promotion could arguably be indirect discrimination. The
requirement might be applied equally to male and female employees. However,
because many female employees take maternity leave the 'proportion of women
who can comply with it' would be 'considerably smaller than the proportion of
men who can comply with it.' In Western Australia, this argument was used by
a female teacher to challenge promotion guidelines in state schools. The
complainant had originally been appointed (on the basis of merit) to the
position of Acting Deputy Principal. However a male teacher who had more
years of service complained (relying upon guidelines for promotion that were
based upon length of service and seniority) and had subsequently been given
the position. The Equal Opportunities Tribunal decided that the guidelines
60 See Price v Civil Service Commissioners [1978] ICR 27.
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imposed a 'requirement or condition' that the applicant be a senior teacher
with a substantial period of uninterrupted full-time service and that this
constituted indirect discrimination against the complainant.61
The extent to which the Sex Discrimination Ordinance will be effective
against such practices in Hong Kong depends to a large degree on how courts
interpret the definition of indirect discrimination. The definition used in the
Sex Discrimination Ordinance is fairly traditional and, if narrowly interpreted
by the courts, could exclude many discriminatory hiring and promotion
practices. For example, courts in the United Kingdom have held that the
complainant alleging indirect discrimination must identify a requirement or
condition that acted as an 'absolute bar' to her hiring or promotion.2 As hiring
and promotion decisions are normally based upon a balance of criteria, this is
very difficult to establish. Fearing that Hong Kong courts would follow the UK
courts' interpretation of 'requirement or condition,' Legislative Councillor
Christine Loh proposed (in her Sex and Disability Discrimination (Miscella-
neous Provisions) Bill 1996) a broader definition of indirect discrimination.
However this clause of Loh's bill was vigorously opposed by the government
and pro-business legislators and was defeated.63
The definitions of direct and indirect discrimination make no reference to
intentions and it is not necessary for the complainant to show that the alleged
discriminator intended to discriminate against her. Thus, the motive behind the
discriminatory action will generally be irrelevant to determining whether
unlawful discrimination has occurred. For example, in a case of direct discrimi
nation it would not be a defence for the employer to claim that he refused to
promote a woman for a job requiring frequent travel to China because he felt
that the travel would damage her relationship with her children. Similarly, in
cases of indirect discrimination the fact that the employer may have been
unaware that a requirement for promotion (such as five years of continuous
service) put women at a disadvantage is irrelevant to the question of whether
the requirement constitutes indirect discrimination.
However, motive is relevant to the issue of damages for indirect discrimina-
tion. This is because the Sex Discrimination Ordinance expressly states that no
damages shall be awarded for indirect discrimination if the employer proves
that the requirement or condition concerned was not applied with the intention
of treating the claimant unfavourably on the ground of her sex, marital status
or pregnancy.64 Of course, if the employer had been made aware (for example
by the Equal Opportunities Commission or by a prior court decision) that a
particular requirement constituted indirect discrimination, then continued
61 Kemp v Minister for Education [19911 EOC para 92-340.
62 See Perera v Civil Service Commission and Department of Customs & Excise (No 2) [1983] IRLR 141 and
Meer v London Borough of Tower Hamlets [1988] IRLR 399.
63 See Draft of Official Record of Proceedings of Hong Kong Legislative Council, 11 June 1997, pp 201-4.
64 Sex Discrimination Ordinance, s 76(5).
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application of that requirement could be considered intentional discrimina-
tion and thus warrant an award of damages.
On its face, s 11 appears to prohibit only sex discrimination against a woman
(as defined in s 5). However, s 6 states that 'Section 5, and the provisions of
Parts III and IV relating to sex discrimination against women, shall be read as
applying equally to the treatment of men, and for that purpose shall have effect
with such modifications as necessary.' Thus, in cases in which a man alleges sex
discrimination, the court would have to substitute 'man' for 'woman' and 'his
sex' for 'her sex' in s 5, and make similar modifications to numerous other
relevant provisions of the ordinance.
This situation is the result of a decision on the part of the Hong Kong
government to copy much of the UK Sex Discrimination Act. Women's
organisations objected to this approach, arguing that the UK Act was outdated
and that the government should adopt a gender neutral drafting style.65
Moreover, the language used is simply confusing - a non-lawyer could easily
miss s 6 and incorrectly assume that s 11 and the many other similarly worded
provisions in the ordinance prohibit only discrimination against women.
Gender neutral language, such as that used in Wu's Equal Opportunities Bill
(which referred, for example, to discrimination 'against a person on the grounds
of that person's sex') would have avoided these problems. However, the
government refused to make any amendments of this nature. It is unlikely that
any legislator will now try to amend the ordinance to adopt gender neutral
language, as this would require rewriting many provisions.
Marital status, pregnancy, and family status discrimination
In addition to discrimination on the ground of sex, the Sex Discrimination
Ordinance also prohibits discrimination on the grounds of marital status and
pregnancy. This is accomplished in ss 7-8, which essentially expand the
definition of discrimination to include discrimination on the ground of a
person's marital status or pregnancy. The definitions of these types of discrimi-
nation are substantially similar to the definition of sex discrimination, adopting
the same two-part (direct and indirect) structure and thus the principles
discussed above are applicable.
The prohibition of pregnancy discrimination may well cause employers
more concern than the sex discrimination provisions. Now that women will be
able to initiate a civil action and obtain damages, they will have far more
incentive to complain about employers who fire or mistreat them when they
become pregnant. From the perspective of the business community, the
pregnancy provision probably constitutes one of the most 'interventionist'
65 See Submission of the Coalition of Women's Organisations to the Bills Committee to Study the Sex
Discrimination Bill (signed by thirteen women's organisations and circulated to the Bills Committee
in January 1995), para 5.
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parts of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance. As the obligation to pay maternity
leave clearly costs employers money, many employers may view the decision to
fire a pregnant worker as a perfectly 'rational' business practice.
Discrimination on the ground of family responsibility (or 'family status')
occurs when an employer treats an employee or applicant less favourably
because of her family responsibilities. For example, an employer who refuses to
hire a mother of young children (because he assumes that she will not want to
work overtime) has discriminated against her on the ground of her family
status. Family status was one of the areas of discrimination that was included
in Anna Wu's Equal Opportunities Bill but excluded from the government's
Sex Discrimination Bill. However, in the course of the government's last
minute lobbying against Wu's bill, it promised to conduct formal public
consultation on the additional areas of discrimination covered by her bill.
Thus, after Wu's bill was defeated the government was obligated to consult the
public on the topics of age, family status, race, and sexuality discrimination.6
At the end of these consultation exercises, the government concluded that
only family status discrimination legislation enjoyed sufficient public support
(and was sufficiently non-controversial).67 The government thus proposed a
bill which was enacted in June 1997.68 The new law is almost identical in
structure and language to the Sex Discrimination Ordinance and thus the
principles discussed above are applicable to it.
Exceptions from the duty not to discriminate
Both the Sex Discrimination Ordinance and the Family Status Discrimination
Ordinance set forth certain situations in which the prohibition against dis-
crimination in employment will not apply.69 For example, although affirmative
action is never required by the ordinance, there is an express exception for
See Equal Opportunities: A Study on Discrimination in Employment on the Ground of Age - A
Consultation Paper (1996); Equal Opportunities: A Study on Discrimination on the Ground of Family
Status - A Consultation Paper (1996); Equal Opportunites: A Study on Discrimination on the Ground
of Race - A Consultation Paper (1997); and Equal Opportunities: A Study on Discrimination on the
Ground of Sexual Orientation - A Consultation Paper (1996) (all published by Hong Kong govern-
ment, 1996). For a critique of the sexuality consultation exercise and its significance to the gay and
lesbian rights movement in Hong Kong, see Carole J Petersen, 'Values in Transition: The Develop-
ment of the Gay and Lesbian Rights Movement in Hong Kong' (1997) 19 Loyola of Los Angeles
International & Comparative Law Journal 337, 358-62.
67 See Home Affairs Branch, 'Equal Opportunities: Family Status and Sexual Orientation' (Hong Kong:
Legislative Council Brief).
68 Family Status Discrimination Ordinance.
69 One exemption that is not addressed in this article is the temporary exemption (s 57) for the
'protective laws' that restrict the nature and hours of women's work. The government has been
compelled to review these laws and gradually reform them (either to eliminate regulations that are
clearly discriminatory or to apply them to both sexes). Thus this exemption is becoming increasingly
less significant and should eventually apply only to regulations that protect women from risks that
are truly specific to them. For examples of the protective regulations, see Petersen, 'Equality as a
Human Right' (note 12 above), pp 345-6 and England (note 6 above), pp 179-81. For a discussion
of how protective legislation was reformed in the United Kingdom (as part of its implementation of
the European Commission's Equal Treatment Directive), see Simon Deakin and Gillian S. Morris,
Labour Law (London: Butterworths, 1995), pp 544-5.
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voluntary affirmative action." Thus if an engineering firm has never employed
a female engineer and wishes to make up for past discrimination against women
applicants by only advertising for female engineers for a period of time, this
should not be considered unlawful discrimination against men.
The other important exemption for the private employment market is
s 12(1) of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance, which permits employers to
refuse to hire a woman where 'being a man is a genuine occupational qualifi-
cation for the job.' This section (which also applies to decisions to hire only
women, by operation of s 6) provides a list of the situations in which being a
particular sex will be considered a 'genuine occupational qualification' (for
example, jobs involving a state of undress). However, the list is quite specific
and narrowly defined. Moreover, it expressly prohibits employers from making
the stereotypical judgment that jobs requiring 'physical strength or stamina'
must be performed by men.7 Thus, employers may not claim that a man must
be hired as a security guard on the assumption that only a man would have
sufficient strength and presence for the job. Rather the employer must specify
the qualifications (eg physical strength or the ability to confront an unwelcome
visitor) and allow women as well as men to apply for the job. If enforced, this
would require a significant change in recruitment policies for many jobs
traditionally viewed as being unsuitable for women. Indeed, when the issue was
discussed in one of the meetings of the Bills Committee, one legislator (who has
actually supported the women's movement in many other contexts) admitted
that he found the very idea of women security guards to be 'mind boggling.'
It is too soon to assess the extent to which employers are actually changing
their practices in order to comply with the new law. In a recent Legislative
Council debate on Christine Loh's bill to amend the ordinance, James Tien (a
conservative pro-business legislator) claimed that employers have been work-
ing hard to understand the law and comply with it. But Mr Tien's comments
may reveal something about the meaning of 'compliance' in the minds of
employers. In describing the new 'personnel policy and administrative proce-
dures' that have been developed by employers to 'deal with' the new laws, Mr
Tien stated:
we have learnt not to specify female in advertising for a female secretary. We
will simply advertise for a secretary, even though at the end we will only offer
a secretary job to a female. For example, we have learnt that when we
decided not to promote a female employee but a male employee, we should
70 Sex Discrimination Ordinance, s 48; Family Status Discrimination Ordinance, s 36. This section did
not appear in the Sex Discrimination Bill, as originally drafted by the government. However, the
government agreed to borrow the provision from cl 37 of Anna Wu's Equal Opportunities Bill. See
also the Sex Discrimination Ordinance Code of Practice, para 8.1.
71 Sex Discrimination Ordinance, s 12(2)(a).
Vol127 Part 3 Hong Kong's first anti-discrimination laws 341
not tell the female employee that she is not promoted because she is a
female, just tell her she is less qualified."
Clearly, such cynical tactics (while admittedly making it more difficult to
prove discrimination) do not constitute 'such steps as were reasonably practi-
cable' to prevent unlawful discrimination. One hopes that employers will be
more sincere in their efforts to implement the new laws.
Sexual harassment
Sexual harassment of working women has been a serious threat to women from
the time they entered the workforce. In addition to harming the victim, sexual
harassment hurts the entire organisation, as it creates a stressful work environ-
ment and may cause victims to be absent from work or to quit their jobs. 3
Nonetheless, until the Sex Discrimination Ordinance came into force, women
who suffered harassment had little or no legal recourse.74 As a result, most Hong
Kong employers ignored the issue and failed to introduce company policies
condemning it.75
In many jurisdictions, the law relating to sexual harassment has arisen from
judicial interpretation of statutes prohibiting sex discrimination. For example,
in Strathclyde Regional Council v Porcelli,76 the court held that if the harassment
constituted less favourable treatment on the ground of sex it could be consid-
ered discrimination within the meaning of the UK Sex Discrimination Act.
Similarly, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 77 the US Supreme Court
endorsed guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission that
characterised sexual harassment as a form of unlawful sex discrimination. In
New South Wales, Australia, the Equal Opportunity Tribunal also held that
sexual harassment can amount to a 'term or condition of employment' or a
'detriment' and therefore can constitute sex discrimination.7
7Z Speech by James Tien, Draft Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 11 June 1887, p 163.
73 For the first comprehensive study of the problem of sexual harassment at work (in the context of the
American legal system), see Catharine A MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1979). See also Haiel Houghton-James, Sexual Harassment (London:
Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1995).
74 Previously, sexual harassment was only unlawful if it amounted to a criminal offence (such as sexual
assault). Of course, since any employee who made a complaint of sexual assault against her employer
was certain to lose her job, this provided no real remedy.
71 See Harriet Samuels, 'Upholding the Dignity of Hong Kong Women: Legal Responses to Sexual
Harassment' (Winter 1995) 4 Asia Pacific Law Review, No 2, pp 92-3.76 [19861 IRLR 134 CS.
77 477 US 57, 106 S Ct 2999 (1986).
78 O'Callaghan v Loder [1984] EOC para 92-023. New South Wales has since amended its legislation to
expressly prohibit sexual harassment.
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Increasingly, however, legislatures are enacting laws which expressly pro-
hibit sexual harassment.79 Hong Kong wisely followed this example, providing
a statutory definition of sexual harassment and prohibiting it in several
protected spheres (including employment, education, and the provision of
goods and services). This approach provides more certainty and avoids the need
for argument in court on the issue of whether the harassment constituted sex
discrimination.
The Sex Discrimination Ordinance prohibits sexual harassment in a wide
range of working relationships. For example, s 23 makes it unlawful for an
employer to sexually harass an employee or a person who is seeking to become
an employee. It is also unlawful for one employee to harass a fellow employee
or a person who is seeking to become a fellow employee. Workers who are
outside the strict definition of an employee (such as contract workers, commis-
sion agents, and partners in a firm) are similarly protected. The prohibition on
sexual harassment is actually more 'interventionist' than the provisions relat-
ing to sex discrimination in that there is no temporary exemption for small
businesses and no exemption for partnerships with fewer than six partners.
Thus all employers should be taking steps to prevent sexual harassment in the
workplace - or risk vicarious liability for harassment by their employees,
partners, and agents."0
Section 2(5) of the ordinance defines sexual harassment as follows:
For the purposes of this Ordinance, a person (howsoever described) sexually
harasses a woman if -
(a) the person -
(i) makes an unwelcome sexual advance, or an unwelcome request
for sexual favours, to her; or
(ii) engages in other unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature in
relation to her,
in circumstances in which a reasonable person, having regard to all the
circumstances, would have anticipated that she would be offended,
humiliated, or intimidated; or
(b) the person, alone or together with other persons, engages in conduct
of a sexual nature which creates a sexually hostile or intimidating work
environment for her."
79 For example in Australia, federal, Victorian, New South Welsh, South Australian, Western
Australian, Australian Capital Territory, and Northern Territory legislation all contain specific
provisions prohibiting sexual harassment. See Australian and New Zealand Equal Opportunities Law
and Practice (Sydney: CCH Australia Limited), para 59-500.80 The ordinance also prohibits sexual harassment in several areas that are outside the workplace but
related to employment. For example, it is unlawful for a member of the staff of an employment agency,
trade union, or qualifying body to sexually harass a person. It is also unlawful for a person who makes
arrangements for women to undergo training in connection with employment to sexually harass a
woman seeking or undergoing such training. See Sex Discrimination Ordinance, s 24.
81 Section 2(8) provides that this definition and the various sections prohibiting sexual harassment are
to be 'treated as applying equally to the treatment of men.'
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Subsection (a) is often described as quid pro quo harassment. The unwel-
come advance, request, or conduct must have been made 'to her' or 'in relation
to her.' Subsection (a) also imposes a partly 'objective test,' by requiring that
the request, advance, or conduct occurred in circumstances in which a
reasonable person would have anticipated that the victim would be offended,
humiliated, or intimidated. To a large extent, the court's decision on whether
conduct was unlawful will depend on how the court defines the 'reasonable
person.' Is it the average Hong Kong male supervisor? The average Hong Kong
female secretary? There is likely to be substantial difference in their views as to
what could cause a person to feel offended, humiliated, or intimidated. 2 For
example, in a case in the United States a trial court dismissed love letters and
persistent requests for dates as 'trivial.' However, the appellate court disagreed
and expressly adopted a 'reasonable woman' standard for assessing whether
conduct constituted unlawful harassment.8 3
Subsection (b) of the definition is significantly broader than sub-s (a), in
that it covers situations in which the sexual conduct may not have been
directed specifically at the victim, but nonetheless created a 'sexually hostile
or intimidating working environment for her.' The government agreed to add
this provision to its initial draft of the bill at the request of Anna Wu and
women's organisations.
The effect of sub-s (b) can best be demonstrated by an example: assume that
a male employee plasters the walls of the coffee room with sexually explicit
posters. A woman employee might be very offended and intimidated by such
posters. But she might have difficulty taking action under the definition of quid
pro quo sexual harassment, as the defendant would argue that the posters did
not constitute an unwelcome sexual advance or a request for sexual favours to
her, or 'conduct of a sexual nature in relation to her' (unless the posters happened
to make some reference to her). However, the woman employee could make a
complaint of sexual harassment based upon sub-s (b), providing that she can
show that the posters create a 'sexually hostile or intimidating work environ-
ment. 8
4
82 For example, a recent survey of students at Chinese University found that a far greater percentage of
female students than male students thought that sexual harassment was prevalent on campus. See
Thomas Siu-kin Wong, 'The Subjectivities of Sexual Harassment Among University Students,'
paper presented at the International Conference on Violence Against Women: Chinese and
American Experiences, November 1994.8 Ellison v Brady, 934 F 2d 872, 878-81 (9th Cir 1991). For further discussion of male and female
perspectives on sexual harassment, see Jane L Dolkart, 'Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality,
Objectivity, and the Shaping of Legal Standards' (1994) 43 Emory Law Journal 151; Susan Estrich,
'Sex at Work' (1991) 43 Stanford Law Review 813; and Nancy Ehrenreich, 'Pluralist Myths and
Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law' (1990) 99 Yale Law
Journal 1177.8 Sex Discrimination Ordinance, s 2(6). This part of the definition of sexual harassment is restricted
to the area of employment and does not apply to the areas of education, housing, or the supply of goods
and services: ibid, s 2(7).
344 Carole I Petersen (1997) HKL1
As noted earlier, the Sex Discrimination Ordinance imposes vicarious
liability on the employer unless he can show that he took 'such steps as were
reasonably practicable' to prevent his employee or agent from committing the
unlawful act. What is 'reasonably practicable' will, of course, vary according to
the size and sophistication of the organisation. A shop-owner with just three
employees might not be expected to do much more than make it clear that
sexual harassment is not permitted. However, large companies are clearly
capable of more and the Sex Discrimination Ordinance Code of Practice on
Employment provides very detailed recommendations on what they should do
to prevent and address harassment.
For example, the Code states that employers should formulate a policy
statement against sexual harassment, which should include a 'clear statement
that sexual harassment will not be tolerated,' 5 the 'legal definition of sexual
harassment,' 6 and examples of prohibited conduct.8 7 The policy should be
widely circulated through distribution of the written policy statement, posting
of notices, discussion at staff meetings, and 'training and refresher courses.' 8
The employer should also designate a 'co-ordinator, preferably with special
training' to establish and administer both informal and formal complaints
procedures.89 The procedures must assure potential complainants that 'no one
will be victimized or penalized for coming forward with a complaint.'90 The co-
ordinator and all other staff members involved in the complaints procedure
should receive adequate training to ensure 'sensitive treatment of cases,'
including training on what is sexual harassment, how to prevent it, and how to
deal with it.91
Clearly, the recommendations cited above (which are only a partial list) will
require a certain amount of managerial time (and therefore money) to design
and implement. Moreover, they will require Hong Kong employers to actively
delve into a sensitive area of employee relations - one which many employers
would probably prefer to ignore. Employers may also encounter significant
resistance from senior staff members who are not particularly interested in
curtailing (or 'sensitising') their behaviour. However, if an employer does not
take the initiative and make a reasonable attempt to follow these recommen-
dations, it could be vicariously liable for sexual harassment, despite the fact that
it may have occurred without its consent or knowledge.
85 Sex Discrimination Ordinance Code of Practice on Employment, para 20.2.2.
86 Ibid, para 20.2.3.
87 Ibid, para 20.2.4.
88 Ibid, para 21.3.
89 lbid, para 2.1.
90 Ibid, para 20.2.7.
91 Ibid, para 21.4.
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Disability discrimination
The motivating force behind the enactment of the Disability Discrimination
Ordinance was a series of protests (against the establishment of centres for the
mentally disabled in residential neighbourhoods) in which disabled patients
and their carets were harassed, both verbally and physically. These incidents of
harassment were well-publicised in Hong Kong and drew attention to the
plight of mentally and physically disabled people in Hong Kong. However, as
this article is confined to the employment-related aspects of the new laws, the
discussion here is limited to disability discrimination (rather than harass-
ment)92 and focuses on the provisions most relevant to employers.
People with disabilities face significant attitudinal prejudice when they
apply for jobs in Hong Kong. In addition, they are greatly disadvantaged by the
very nature of Hong Kong's environment. Anyone who has ever tried to
navigate Hong Kong in a wheelchair (or even with a child's pushchair) will
know that it is far from being 'barrier free.' Many buildings lack elevators or
ramps and have narrow doors and hallways. Offices tend to be very crowded,
with desks placed close together, leaving little room for people (or wheelchairs)
to manoeuvre. Indeed, the seemingly constant construction in Hong Kong
makes even the pavements virtual obstacle courses. Thus, it is extremely
difficult for physically challenged people to get to work and to function in the
workplace.
Of course, no law can change attitudes (or buildings) overnight. And there
are limits to the changes that employers can be required to make to accommo-
date employees with disabilities. Thus, the Disability Discrimination Ordi-
nance seeks to strike a balance between the goal of equal opportunities for the
disabled and other legitimate concerns.
The definition of discrimination under the Disability Discrimination Ordi-
nance is similar to that under the Sex Discrimination Ordinance in that it
employs the same basic two-part (direct and indirect) structure.93 However, the
ordinance also includes within the definition certain grounds of discrimination
that are especially relevant to the disabled, such as discrimination on the
ground that a person uses a particular auxiliary aid or is accompanied by a reader
or carer.
94
In the area of employment, the ordinance prohibits discrimination against
applicants and employees, in language that is similar to s 11 of the Sex
Discrimination Ordinance.95 Small employers (those with fewer than six
92 Of course, disability harassment could also be a problem in the workplace. The fact that there have
not been many complaints of it thus far may be simply because disability discrimination has kept most
people with disabilities out of the employment market.
93 Disability Discrimination Ordinance, s 6.
94 lbid, s 9.91 [bid, s 11.
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employees) are exempt from the duty not to discriminate until the summer of
1998.96 Like the Sex Discrimination Ordinance, the Disability Discrimination
Ordinance has special provisions to protect workers who are outside the legal
definition of employee, such as existing or prospective contract workers and
partners (where the partnership consists of at least six partners). 97 The
ordinance also prohibits discrimination by organisations that can impact upon
people's employment opportunities (such as trade unions, employment agen-
cies, or qualifying bodies).9"
However, in other areas the Disability Ordinance differs significantly from
the Sex Discrimination Ordinance. A good example is s 12, which defines
where the absence of a disability is deemed a genuine occupational qualifica-
tion, permitting the employer to refuse to hire a person with a disability. While
the Sex Discrimination Ordinance provides a fairly specific list of situations in
which sex is a 'genuine occupational qualification,' the Disability Discrimina-
tion Ordinance sets forth a more general standard, one that takes into account
the ability of the employer to make accommodations required by the disabled
employee or applicant. For example, s 12(2) provides that the obligation not
to discriminate in the hiring and firing process shall not apply if, taking into
account all relevant factors:
the person, because of the person's disability -
(i) would be unable to carry out the inherent requirements of the particu-
lar employment; or
(ii) would, in order to carry out those requirements, require services or
facilities that are not required by persons without a disability and the
provision of which would impose an unjustifiable hardship on the
employer.
While s 12 provides certain other exceptions, the 'unjustifiable hardship'
clause will be the one relied upon most often by employers who do not wish to
employ someone with a disability. Fortunately, the ordinance provides some
guidance as to the meaning of this term. Section 4 states that in determining
what constitutes 'unjustifiable hardship,' all relevant circumstances of the
particular case are to be taken into account including:
(a) the reasonableness of any accommodation to be made available to a
person with a disability;
16 Ibid, s, 11(3)-11(5). The exemption does not apply to 'victimisation' (discrimination on the ground
that the employee or applicant has taken action to enforce the ordinance): ibid, s 11(3) and s 7.
9 lbid, ss 13, 15, and 20.
9s Ibid, ss 16-19.
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(b) the nature of the benefit or detriment likely to accrue or be suffered by
any persons concerned;
(c) the effect of the disability of a person concerned;
(d) the financial circumstances of and the estimated amount of expendi-
ture (including recurrent expenditure) required to be made by the
person claiming unjustifiable hardship.
Thus the concept of 'unjustifiable hardship' requires the court to balance the
needs of the disabled worker against those of the employer. It makes it clear that
the mere fact that an employer may have to spend some money to accommodate
the needs of the disabled job applicant (for example, to install a ramp or widen
the doors for a wheelchair) will not automatically excuse an employer for
refusing to hire that person.
Both the ordinance and the Disability Discrimination Ordinance Code of
Practice on Employment make it clear that large companies in particular will
be expected to spend money to accommodate disabled applicants and employ-
ees.99 For example, the Code of Practice notes that the 'reasonable' accommo-
dations that could be required of employers might include: 'changes or
adjustments to recruitment and selection procedures'; 'modifications to work
premises to ensure that work areas and facilities are accessible and can meet the
special needs of employees with a disability'; 'changes to job design, work
schedules or other work practices ... such as job-sharing and flexi-hours'; and
'provision and modification of equipment to enable ease of use by employees
with a disability. ' 1° The Code of Practice also makes it clear that the fact that
a company may fear that customers or clients will object to the presence of a
disabled employee is not an acceptable excuse for failing to employ that
person.' 01
In many countries, it would not be viewed as particularly radical to expect
employers (particularly large companies) to make such adjustments. But in
Hong Kong (where the very concept of anti-discrimination legislation is
considered quite radical by many employers) it may be viewed as an enormous
interference in their business decisions. At the 'bottom line,' an applicant who
has the same qualifications as the disabled applicant and does not require any
special accommodations will cost the employer less money. Therefore, employ-
ers may argue that it should not be considered 'discrimination,' but rather a
rational business decision, to decline to hire the disabled applicant or to pay
him a lower salary (to cover the cost of the accommodation).
99 See Disability Discrimination Ordinance Code of Practice on Employment, para 11.
100 lbid, para 11.12.101 See Disability Discrimination Code of Practice, para 3.1.2, citing (as an example of direct discrimi-
nation) the hypothetical situation in which a company refuses to hire a blind person because it feared
he would hurt their 'corporate image.'
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The Disability Discrimination Ordinance was enacted at a time when there
was strong public support for the disabled. It was also a time when the
government and the business community were anxious to agree to a compro-
mise - the enactment of two specific bills, rather than Anna Wu's much
broader bill. As a result of these political pressures (and simple time con-
straints), 0 2 the specific terms of the Disability Discrimination Ordinance
received far less scrutiny in the Bills Committee and in the public than the Sex
Discrimination Ordinance. It is too early to predict how many disabled persons
will try to take advantage of the legislation and apply for jobs that might require
some accommodation by the employer. If a significant number of disabled
persons do so, the Disability Discrimination Ordinance could turn out to have
an even greater impact on employers than the anti-discrimination provisions
of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance.
Remedies and enforcement
Of course the impact of the new laws depends to a large extent on the remedies
available to victims and the extent to which the laws can be effectively
implemented. This section thus considers: (1) the remedies available to victims
who commence civil actions, and (2) the powers of the Equal Opportunities
Commission (both in assisting individual complainants and in initiating its
own enforcement actions).
Remedies available to individual complainants
One important remedy is that of reinstatement - the power of the court to
order that the respondent hire or rehire a person who was either not hired or
was fired as a result of discrimination. This remedy did not appear in the original
bills as drafted by the government. However it was added to the Disability
Discrimination Ordinance (in the process of enactment) by means of an
amendment proposed by Anna Wu and the Bills Committee." 3 When Wu and
the Bills Committee proposed the same amendment to the government's Sex
Discrimination Bill (one month earlier) it was defeated. However, women's
organisations continued to lobby for the remedy of reinstatement and it was
difficult for the legislature to justify maintaining unequal remedies under the
two laws. The remedy was finally added to the Sex Discrimination Ordinance
in 1997, when Christine Loh's bill was enacted. 104 If ordered by the courts, the
remedy likely will be regarded by employers as the height of intervention in
10Z The government's Disability Discrimination Ordinance was not introduced into the Legislative
Council until April 1995. However, the government was anxious that it be put to a vote by July 1995.
Otherwise it could not be offered as a realistic alternative to the disability discrimination provisions
of Anna Wu's Equal Opportunities Bill.
103 Disability Discrimination Ordinance, s 72(4)().
L04 Sex and Disability Discrimination (Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance, s 7.
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their business decisions. Of course, it is within the discretion of the court to
decide not to order it and in many cases the court will find that it is simply not
appropriate (for example where hostility would make it difficult for the victim
to work for the respondent). However, reinstatement can be an effective and
workable remedy against large institutional employers (where the complainant
might get along quite well with his or her co-workers).
The other main remedy available to plaintiffs is that of money damages. As
originally enacted (in 1995), the ordinances provided for very limited damages.
The legislature approved a last-minute amendment to the Sex Discrimination
Ordinance (proposed by a conservative pro-business legislator and supported
by the government) limiting damages for sex discrimination and sexual
harassment to a maximum of HK$150,000 (less than US$20,000). 105 The
amendment was not supported by the Bills Committee that studied the bill and
it took many women's organisations by surprise. The limitation on damages
applied regardless of the amount of losses the victim had suffered. This was
particularly severe given the high legal fees charged in Hong Kong and the fact
that the ordinances do not normally permit the court to award legal costs of the
action to the winner (the o p'osite of the standard procedure in Hong Kong).")'
Thus, a woman who successfully sued under the Sex Discrimination Ordinance
might not only have failed to recover her actual damages, she might not even
have recovered enough to pay her legal expenses.
The limitation on damages created an uproar among women's organisations
when it was added to the Sex Discrimination Ordinance. As a result of their
objections (and of lobbying by disability rights groups, Anna Wu, and other
legislators), no express limitation was proposed when the Disability Discrimi-
nation Ordinance was debated, just one month later. Nonetheless, a cap on
damages apparently worked its way into that ordinance, albeit inadvertently.
This occurred because, in the course of amending the remedies language of the
Disability Discrimination Ordinance (ironically, in an effort to strengthen the
remedies), the government and Legislative Council inadvertently left out
language (which was in the Sex Discrimination Ordinance) expanding the
power of the District Court (where claims under both ordinances are to be
brought) to award damages beyond the normal limit of $120,000. This
accidental limit on damages in the Disability Discrimination Ordinance was
even lower than the limitation expressly provided in the Sex Discrimination
Ordinance and would rarely be enough to compensate a disabled employee who
was either denied a job or fired as a result of discrimination.
105 Sex Discrimination Ordinance, s 76(7).
106 Sex Discrimination Ordinance, Schedule 8 (consequential amendments), para 15, adding a new s
73B(3) to the District Court Ordinance, which provides: 'Each party to any proceedings ... under the
Sex Discrimination Ordinance shall bear its own costs unless the Court otherwise orders on the
ground that - (a) the proceedings were brought maliciously or frivolously; or (b) there are special
circumstances which warrant an award of costs.' A similar provision appears in Schedule 6
(consequential amendments), para 4 of the Disability Discrimination Ordinance (adding a new s 73C
to the District Court Ordinance).
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It was quite clear from the legislative history that legislators did not intend
this result. Nonetheless, when the error became known, the government made
no proposal to amend the Disability Discrimination Ordinance so as to repeal
the implied limitation on damages. The government also refused to support any
move to repeal the express limitation on damages in the Sex Discrimination
Ordinance. This was not surprising - the business community was very happy
with the damages limitations and, once the immediate threat of Wu's Equal
Opportunities Bill was gone (Wu left the legislature in 1995 to return to her law
practice), the government had little incentive to make any more concessions
departing from its traditional 'pro-business' policies.
The issue was finally addressed by a private member's bill. Christine Loh
introduced the Sex and Disability Discrimination (Miscellaneous Provisions)
Bill 1996, which was enacted in July 1997 (despite opposition from govern-
ment and the pro-business legislators). Although many of the clauses in her bill
were defeated, Loh did succeed in adding the remedy of reinstatement to the
Sex Discrimination Ordinance and in repealing the limitations on damages in
both ordinances. Victims of discrimination can be thankful that her bill was
enacted before the elected Legislative Council was dissolved by China (on
1 July 1997). For it is clear that the entirely appointed 'provisional' legislature
would not have approved any legislation to strengthen the remedies available
for discrimination.
Enforcement powers of the Equal Opportunities Commission
Given the high cost of litigating in Hong Kong and the fact that Hong Kong
lawyers are not permitted to work for contingency fees, it was always antici-
pated that complainants would rely heavily on the Equal Opportunities
Commission to enforce their new rights under the ordinances. This section
provides a brief overview of the powers of the Commission that could affect the
employment field.
When the Commission receives a complaint of discrimination or harass-
ment, there are several ways in which it can assist the victim. For example, it
has the power to investigate the complaint and to attempt to conciliate it.1"7
If the attempt to conciliate fails, the Commission also has the power to give
assistance (including free legal assistance) to complainants who wish to initiate
civil proceedings."10 Legal assistance would greatly increase the likelihood of
a lawsuit - particularly as the Commission would only make such an offer if
it thought that the plaintiff had a viable complaint. The fact that the
Commission can assist complainants with their civil actions should encourage
107 Sex Discrimination Ordinance, s 84; Disability Discrimination Ordinance, s 80. As a result of
amendments made by Christine Loh's bill, time spent in conciliation will no longer be counted
against the complainant for purposes of determining whether the claim is time barred. See Sex and
Disability Discrimination (Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance, ss 8 and 13. This will encourage
victims to continue to conciliate their claims.108 Sex Discrimination Ordinance, ss 83 and 85; Disability Discrimination Ordinance, ss 70 and 81.
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employers to participate in good faith in efforts to conciliate the complaint.
Indeed a refusal by the respondent to participate in conciliation might later be
considered by the court as a reason to make an exceptional order that the
respondent pay costs.
If the complainant does not wish to pursue the action by herself the
Commission has the power to bring proceedings in its own name and to apply
for any of the remedies that would ordinarily be available to the claimant. The
Commission may exercise this power so long as the case raises a question of
principle, it is in the interests of justice to bring the proceedings, and the claim
appears to be well-founded.0 9
The Commission need not necessarily wait for a formal complaint in order
to act. Rather, it may conduct formal investigations of its own. n° For example,
if two years after the employment provisions of the Sex Discrimination
Ordinance have been brought into force the Commission discovers that a large
accounting firm still has not hired a female accountant, it might decide to
launch a formal investigation - despite the fact that no women are prepared
to file a complaint. The Commission can conduct a general investigation (where
it believes an investigation is warranted in the public interest, but has not yet
formed a belief that a particular person or entity has committed an unlawful act)
or a belief investigation (where it believes that the person named in its terms of
reference may have committed an unlawful act). If the investigation satisfies
the Commission that a person has committed an unlawful act, it has the power
to issue enforcement notices."' Such notices may require a person to cease
committing the act in question, to change his practices, or to avoid committing
the act again. If it appears that the person served with such a notice is
nonetheless likely to commit an unlawful act, the Commission may apply to the
District Court for an injunction to restrain the person from doing so." 2
However, it should be noted that the procedures that the Commission must
follow when conducting a formal investigation"' are based upon those of the
UK Equal Opportunities Commission and have been widely criticised as
unduly complex and cumbersome. The result has been that few formal
investigations have been commenced in the UK and even fewer have been
completed." 4 Nonetheless, the Hong Kong government seems wedded to the
UK procedures and has steadfastly opposed amendments to improve them
109 Sex Discrimination (Proceeding by Equal Opportunities Commission) Regulations, LN 539 of 1996,
reg 2.110 Sex Discrimination Ordinance, ss 70-1; Disability Discrimination Ordinance, ss 66,7. See also the
Sex Discrimination (Formal Investigations) Rules, LN No 472 of 1996, and the Disability Discrimi-
nation (Formal Investigations) Rules, LN No 474 of 1996.
l Sex Discrimination Ordinance, s 77; Disability Discrimination Ordinance, s 73.
"' Sex Discrimination Ordinance, s 81; Disability Discrimination Ordinance, s 77.113 Sex Discrimination Ordinance, ss 70-74; Disability Discrimination Ordinance, ss 66-70.
114 See George Applebey and Evelyn Ellis, 'Formal Investigations: the Commission for Racial Equality
and the Equal Opportunities Commission as Law Enforcement Agencies' [1984] Public Law 236.
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(including amendments that have been recommended by the UK Commission
itself). 115 Thus, victims of discrimination in Hong Kong should not expect
much from the Commission in the area of formal investigations.
The Commission has also been given special enforcement powers with
respect to the publication of discriminatory job advertisements. Such adver-
tisements are prohibited by both the Sex Discrimination Ordinance and the
Disability Discrimination Ordinance. 16 However, an individual would be
unlikely to file a complaint about a particular advertisement (as it would be
difficult to prove that he or she suffered any damage as a result of its
publication). Thus both ordinances give the Commission the power to apply
to the District Court for an order imposing a financial penalty on the publisher
of an unlawful advertisement." 7 The Commission may also apply for an
injunction restraining a person from publishing such advertisements in the
future."' When the employment provisions came into force, the Commission
sent out letters to Hong Kong newspapers warning them of these consequences.
Since the Commission sent out these letters it has noted a substantial decrease
in the incidence of sex-specific and other discriminatory job advertisements." 9
The Commission can also make complaints to the police to initiate prosecution
of certain acts that constitute statutory offences under the ordinance (such as
the offence of making a false statement to a publisher to cause him to publish
a discriminatory advertisement).
The effectiveness of the laws will depend to a great extent on how proactive
the Commission is with respect to aiding complainants and investigating
employers. Local women's organisations have already complained that the
Commission is too conservative and that it has tended to focus too much on
technical issues of 'gender equality' rather than on the real problem of
discrimination against women. 2' However, it is too soon to draw any firm
conclusions regarding the Commission. Its approach to the Codes of Practice
indicates that it is not afraid to confront employers and challenge their existing
practices. The Codes are not law and a failure to follow them does not itself
create an unlawful act. Yet the Codes constitute strong persuasive authority on
the nature of the acts that employers must avoid and the 'practical steps' that
they must take to avoid vicarious liability for acts of their employees or agents.
The Commission has demonstrated that it is willing to use this 'persuasive'
power to challenge employers to reform their practices in very specific ways. It
11 See Equal Opportunities Commission, Equal Opportunityfor Men and Women: Strengthening the Acts
1- Formal Proposals (March 1988).1t6 Sex Discrimination Ordinance, s 43; Disability Discrimination Ordinance, s 43.
117 Sex Discrimination Ordinance, s 82; Disability Discrimination Ordinance, s 78.
1t8 Ibid.
1'9 Equal Opportunities Commission, EOC News, Issue No 2 (April 1997), p 2.
120 See Hong Kong Coalition on Equal Opportunities, 'Biannual Supervision Report on the Equal
Opportunities Commission' (original Chinese report and summary English translation circulated to
the Hong Kong Legislative Council as Paper No CB(2)2349/96-97(02)).
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remains to be seen whether it will make equally effective use of its more
'coercive' enforcement powers.
Conclusion
Many books and articles have been written praising Hong Kong's 'free market'
ideology and its economic achievements. However, these commentaries some-
times overlook the fact that there have been real costs to society of the
government's reluctance to regulate the business community. 2' Supporters of
Hong Kong's economic policies have also tended to down-play the main reason
that these economic policies could be maintained for so long - Hong Kong was
ruled by a colonial government, one that catered mainly to business interests
and included no elected representatives in the executive or legislative branches.
The transition period between the signing of the Joint Declaration in 1984
and the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997 demonstrated that the
economic ideology for which Hong Kong was so widely known could not be
completely maintained in a democratic system. With the introduction of the
Bill of Rights and an elected legislature, Hong Kong people found their political
voice. They began to demand greater legal protection of their human rights -
not only rights such as freedom of speech and movement, but also the right to
be treated equally and with a certain degree of respect. And they have asked
that such rights be enforceable not only against the government, but also
against those who hold economic power over them - their employers.
It will be interesting to see how post-1997 Hong Kong approaches the issues
of discrimination, workers' rights, and the regulation of business generally.
Despite the promise that Hong Kong would have an 'elected legislature,' China
dissolved the legislature that was elected in 1995 and replaced it with an
entirely appointed 'provisional' legislature. China has promised that the
provisional legislature will serve for only one year, after which new elections
will be held. However, the provisional legislature will enact a new election law
and will return to the system of 61itist 'functional constituencies' preferred by
China,' restoring the business community's dominance of the functional
121 For a discussion of some of these social costs, including poor labour conditions, environmental
destruction, and inadequate social welfare, see David Campbell, 'Economic Ideology and Hong
Kong's Governance Structure After 1997' in Raymond Wacks (ed), Hong Kong, China and 1997:
Essays in Legal Theory (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1993), especially pp 116-20.
122 The Basic Law provides that Hong Kong's first legislature shall consist of sixty members, with thirty
chosen by direct elections from geographic constituencies, ten chosen by an Election Committee,
and twenty chosen by functional constituencies. The functional constituencies in Hong Kong were
originally quite small and 6litist. Govemor Patten (Hong Kong's last colonial governor) successfully
proposed amendments to the election law that made the functional constituencies for the 1995
elections significantly more democratic (widening them so as to permit every working person in Hong
Kong to vote in a functional constituency). China objected strongly and it dissolved the Legislative
Council elected in 1995, replacing it with the appointed provisional legislature. For further
discussion, see Yash Ghai, Hong Kong's New Constitutional Order: the Resumption of Chinese
Sovereignty and the Basic Law (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997), pp 271-80.
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constituency seats. This is very significant, because under the Basic Law the
legislators chosen by the functional constituencies can effectively veto propos-
als made by the directly elected legislators."'
Thus although the transition period leading to 1997 has facilitated a
significant expansion in legislation to protect employees, it is unlikely that this
expansion will continue under the first government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of China. At the same time, it is also unlikely that the
existing anti-discrimination legislation will be repealed. China and the provi-
sional legislature are already committed to a number of unpopular legislative
acts that China believes are necessary to maintain control in Hong Kong.
Neither China nor the Hong Kong SAR government will wish to invite further
unpopularity by repealing the new anti-discrimination laws. These laws appear
to have broad support in the community and, unlike some recent law reform,
cannot be said to interfere with the government's ability to maintain social
order.
It is too soon to assess whether the rights created by the new anti-
discrimination laws can be effectively enforced or whether they will actually
deter discrimination and harassment.12 4 If they are effective, then it will be
interesting to see whether the new laws unduly burden employers and damage
Hong Kong's economy (in the way that the government was once so certain
they would). The hope is that the Equal Opportunities Commission can
persuade most employers to adopt proactive policies to prevent discrimination
and harassment. Such measures can avoid litigation (which is costly and
traumatic for both parties) and improve working conditions. Implementation
of the laws clearly will require a certain amount of time and money. But the
absence of discrimination and sexual harassment in a company can also
improve worker satisfaction and productivity. In any event, it would appear
that Hong Kong has now accepted that these are real problems and that they
no longer can be left entirely to the free market.
123 Annex II to the Basic Law states that 'the passage of motions, bills, or amendments to government
bills introduced by individual members of the Legislative Council shall require a simple majority vote
of each of the two groups of members present: members returned by functional constituencies and
those returned by geographic constituencies through direct elections and by the Election Commit-
tee.' Thus, the functionalconstituencies will have a veto power over proposals made by the directly
elected members.
124 The issue of how effective legislation is in preventing discrimination is highly controversial. See, for
example, the debate between Richard A Posner, 'An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws'
(1989) 56 University of Chicago Law Review 1311, and John J Donohue, 'Prohibiting Sex
Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic Perspective' (1989) 56 University of Chicago Law
Review 1337. See also the various contributions to the 'Symposium on the Gender Gap in
Compensation' (1993) 82 Georgetown Law Journal 27-158, and Richard A Epstein, Forbidden
Grounds: The Case Against Empkment Discrimination Laws (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 1992). Epstein argues that '[clompetitive markets with free entry offer better and more certain
protection against invidious discrimination than any antidiscrimination law': ibid, p 9.
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